

"Splendid China": Virtual reality

Marilyn B. Young

At the close of the 20th century we find ourselves absorbed in a topic that also absorbed commentators at the close of the 19th - nationalism. Like poverty, nationalism seems always to be with us, and perhaps for similar reasons: enduring structures of inequality of wealth and position, both individual and national. The current fashion, as Seamus Deane remarks in a recent essay on Irish nationalism, is to deconstruct nationalism in the interests of demythologizing a deliberately romanticized and thus distorted version of the past. The effect, he argues, is to erase the history of colonialism as well, since nationalism in the colonized world is precisely the product of the dialogue of colonized and colonizer. Since imperial nations assume a universalizing position, any insurgent is necessarily cast in a provincial role. The result is that insurgents

attempt to create a version of history for themselves in which their intrinsic essence has always manifested itself, thereby producing readings of the past that are as monolithic as that which they are trying to supplant.¹

The Chinese case is an interesting variant. Since 1978 the leadership has been engaged in replacing one monolithic version of the past - Mao's revolutionary nationalism - with another. There are many differences between the two, but perhaps the most important is that the Maoist myth of China's past was universalizing, whereas the reformers appeal only to a local, indeed a parochial audience. All nationalisms, Deane notes, involve a "metaphysical essentialism". From 1949 to 1978 at the heart of these metaphysics lay China as the Revolutionary Redeemer Nation. (This was of course quite apart from its actual behaviour in the world; Chinese foreign policy compromised revolutionary internationalism repeatedly.) Having "stood up" in 1949, China would serve as the Middle Kingdom of third world revolutionary nationalism, a shining beacon, a model and an advocate. State and society were firmly wedded and, if there were strains in

¹Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies, vol.6 (1996), pp.1-12.

the marriage, they were resolved by force or persuasion. In post-Mao China, most observers would agree, the disjunction between party-state and society has steadily grown, requiring massive efforts on the part of the state to heal the divisions.

The essence of Maoist nationalism lay in its claim, however contradictory, to national greatness and international purity. The version of nationalism being actively propagated today makes no claim either to internationalism or universalism. The government, desperately seeking re-legitimation, Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim have recently written, has become "the self-styled defender of the national identity and symbol system of the old China".² Deng's China presents itself as the heir to China's long and glorious achievements in art and architecture, to its geographical scale and the diversity of its many nationalities. Chinese political history is not simply ignored, it is actively extirpated. This national myth has no politics, or rather, its politics are explicitly anti-political. The terms of this new-old identity are still being forged. My paper today examines this process as manifested in the representation of China at a series of national and international exhibitions, culminating in the opening this year of "Splendid China" in Orlando, Florida.

Access to Orlando's newest theme park is along an elevated highway. There are no overpasses, few underpasses and a limited number of exits. The traffic flows swiftly, the city skyline to one side, the ghetto to the other, carrying the traveller towards endless ranks of huge hotels and a rich choice of promised pleasures: Sea World, Universal Studios, Disney-MGM Studios, Epcot Center, Disney's Magic Kingdom and now, "Splendid China". Orlando's history of citrus groves and small farms has been erased entirely. This is a world of malls and highways. Its previous social reality has been bulldozed and its present social reality of racial conflict concealed, to make way for its planned, antiseptic and hermetic re-creation. It is a logical setting for China's new definition of itself.

There are two "Splendid Chinas", and probably more at the planning stage. The original occupies 74 acres in the middle of China's newest and fastest-growing city, Shenzhen. The other, in Orlando - recently proclaimed the fastest-growing city in the United States - was built on 76 acres of cleared land in the midst of competing theme parks. This is not the first time a Chinese government has sought to package and export its version of the nation while simultaneously attempting to persuade the Chinese to accept it. All displays of nationalism address both a domestic and an international audience and "Splendid China", like China's participation in world affairs in the early decades of the 20th century, is no different.

For example, the version of nationalism materialized in Nanjing in 1910 was a late Qing effort to demonstrate to Chinese and Westerners alike that the increasingly besieged dynasty was in fact the best representative of

dynamic Chinese nationalism. After a tour of Europe and the United States in 1906-07 Governor-General Tuan Fang was convinced that an international trade fair would demonstrate how much progress China had made and further encourage the forces of modernization. He may also have been influenced by China's humiliation at the 1903 Osaka Trade and Industrial Exposition, which included pavilions of the races of man. Seven Asian races were depicted - the Ainu, Ryukyuan, Formosan aborigines, Korean, Chinese, Hindu and Javanese. "Natives" displayed their handicrafts and ceremonies in "typical" thatched dwellings. The Chinese were represented by their best-known customs - footbinding and opium smoking.³

The symbolism of the 1910 fair was fairly straightforward: the visitor entered through a great Chinese-style gate and left through a gate of Western design. The Hall of Agriculture had a European façade, the roof decorated at its four corners with pagodas and a Chinese interior - the embodiment of *ti-yong* (Chinese learning as the essence, Western learning for use). The Hall of Chihli Province featured a traditional Chinese courtyard, where visitors were greeted by a marching band in Western uniform. For the most part the fair emphasized China's modern accomplishments: there were Halls of Machinery and Transport, Education, Industry and Public Health. Exhibitions of handicrafts were flanked by displays of arms and ammunition.

Similarly, five years later in San Francisco, the new Republic of China announced itself to the world through an even more elaborate mix of "tradition" and modernity. The most striking Chinese contribution (some said it was the highlight of the fair) was a scale model - not a miniature - of the "Forbidden City". Designed in Beijing, built in Shanghai and then shipped for re-assembly at the fair by Shanghai workmen, the model included the Imperial Audience Hall "whence", Frank Morton Todd, the official historian of the fair, noted "issued those intolerant and tyrannous edicts that led to the downfall of the dynasty". A crenellated wall, reminiscent of the Great Wall, set off the Chinese Pavilion from the rest of the fair and within it, Morton observed, one could experience the "Asiatic atmosphere unmistakably, without a taint of occidental sophistication".

All the same, Chinese modernity was on display in almost every hall. The Palace of Transport featured a map of projected railway development, in particular a proposed rail route across China to Constantinople. Pictures and models of existing lines showed goods trains running alongside the Great Wall and the Ming Tombs. To be sure, there were actually only 3,500 miles of railway lines in China but, Todd insisted, China "showed quite remarkable evidence of her modern progress". Besides railways, Chinese products, both modern and traditional, were on display in a variety of venues from the Palace of Fine Arts to the Palace of Liberal Arts, and from the Palace of Industries to the Palaces of Mines and Metallurgy, Agriculture and Food Products. The Palace of Education bore witness to the thousands of

Western-style schools that had been opened, as well as featuring 100 tons of wood carvings and handicrafts produced by the new vocational schools. Moreover, Todd pointed out, this was not the "China of the treaty ports, but the vast domain back of them, the land of 1,500,000 square miles and 4,000 walled cities and towns, and the genius of its ancient family". Overall he concluded, although the Chinese had brought evidence of their antiquity to San Francisco, their participation was that of a "modernized country".⁴

The Nanjing fair did not go unchallenged. Anti-Manchu protestors demonstrated outside, the more aggressive wielding pigtail-cutting scissors. Foreign gunboats gathered in the river to make sure the disturbances did not get out of hand, and a large force of government troops was brought in to prevent a confrontation. In San Francisco local Chinese protested against a private concession featuring an opium den.⁵

Orlando's "Splendid China" has also been subjected to criticism. Just as Nanjing revolutionaries disputed the dynasty's appropriation of Chinese nationalism, Tibetans and their supporters protested against "Splendid China's" inclusive vision of the Chinese nation-state:

"It is offensive," an American spokeswoman for the protestors told an American reporter, "that they could take a holy religious site of the Tibetan people for many centuries, shell it, bomb it, desecrate it, run people out and murder people in there, and then try to portray it as part of Chinese history."⁶

The Florida Chamber of Commerce responded laconically: "Attractions always reflect the positive. That's kind of the nature of their existence. It is not our role to take a position on the human rights issue." Bowing to pressure, however, the owners of "Splendid China" removed a plaque identifying the Potala Palace. The result, ironically, is that visitors think it is the most magnificent thing the Chinese ever built. There are other ironies: originally the project was jointly owned by the China Travel Service (CTS) and Taiwan-born George Chen, president of the Los Angeles-based corporation American Eastern International. CTS bought out Chen in an amicable settlement of unspecified disagreements, but Chen still owns the 513 acres surrounding "Splendid China" which will feature a 256-room hotel and an upmarket shopping centre. The name of Chen's development is "Formosa Gardens".⁷

Shenzhen's "Splendid China", Ann Anagnost has argued, "speaks to the totality of the nation".⁸ It appears as a "surreal simultaneity" of monuments spanning five millenia and in its compression of time and space the intensity of the ideological effect is doubled. "Splendid China", she writes, embodies a "transcendental perspective" which assumes the "eternal verity of the idea of 'China' as a bounded entity". Outside that boundary is modern Shenzhen, its history only a decade old. Together "Splendid China" and Shenzhen represent the "ambivalent temporality of the nation-state",

caught "between its simultaneous desire for being both deeply historical and undeniably modern".⁹

Shenzhen surrounds "Splendid China" in much the same way as the Western exterior of the Hall of Agriculture in Nanjing surrounded its "traditional" interior 80 years earlier. In its very stillness, its reassurance that somewhere outside an original of the finely wrought miniature really exists, the reality of the turbulent changes taking place in the city of Shenzhen and in China itself can be contained and controlled, as the Hall of Agriculture insisted that inside modernity lay a still Chinese core. ("Splendid China" is not unique in this effect. The whole of Epcot Center represents a history in miniature, washed clean of suffering and ambiguity.)

In San Francisco in 1915 the past and the future were separated, the past set in the "Forbidden City", the firm core of ancient China although, or perhaps especially because, it was no longer forbidden. The Forbidden City asserted cultural difference; exhibits in other halls and palaces affirmed modern capacities. The skill of Chinese workmanship was enthusiastically appreciated by foreign observers (as it was in Orlando more recently), and the commercial prospects for the future explicitly welcomed. The workers from Shanghai were not the average Cantonese of San Francisco's Chinatown, but "tall, dark, silent, competent men... dressed in peculiar costume at first but later, with unexpected adaptability, adopting Western overalls and jumpers". They were praised, too, for their excellent workmanship and for the implicit vision of skilled cheap labour combined with Chinese natural resources and Western industrial organization.¹⁰ In Orlando the skill of Chinese artisans received favourable comment and Representative Alzo Reddick took the long view: "This is a monumental day for tourism in Florida," he proclaimed on opening day. "I'm hoping this signals future trade, exchange and tourism. It marks a new degree of maturity between us."¹¹

As Anagnost notes, "Splendid China" has no narrative. The visitor does not move through a national story culminating in the present. There is only the nation itself, offered as an inanimate object for comfortable and comforting contemplation by citizens and foreigners. There is reassurance, too, in the representation of minority nationalities, safely domesticated and, in the words of the park's guidebook, all living lives which have changed for the better without spoiling their customary pleasures. At night in the Dong village, for example, "you can hear the continuous love songs accompanied by... melodious music... filling the atmosphere with joy and love".¹² The Bouyei are also good at singing and dancing and their life "is rich and colourful. After dark, with the lively fast rhythm of bronze drumbeats, people sing and dance merrily far into the night."¹³ The Miao delight in singing love songs far into the night and the Bai, you will not be surprised to learn, are "good at singing and dancing and they live a rich and colourful life". The Hakka circular houses are a "world wonder", while the Dai are

"civilized, courteous and hospitable" and have developed the welcome habit of cleanliness so that "it is really a pleasure to be the guest of the Dai people".¹⁴

It should be noted that, in the section of "Splendid China" devoted to folk-ways, the people of Beijing also appear. For a brief moment the incautious critic might suppose that what we see is a genuine effort at China's version of multiculturalism. However, Beijing is represented by a magnificent mansion in which large numbers of porcelain figures are celebrating the birthday of a member of the imperial household on the 19th of the ninth month of the lunar year in 1922, hardly the equivalent of the simple village dwellings of minorities, however merrily they sing their love songs. (For a "folk", Beijing appears in a remarkably sophisticated mode.) Minority people also appear in theatrical events, both in Shenzhen and Orlando. The ones I watched featured women in tight satin trousers and blouses dancing to the ferocious beat of drums and cymbals played by half-naked young men with very long hair.

In her essay Anagnost comments on the striking lack of any reference to modern Chinese history, but this is not completely accurate. True, the birthplace of Confucius is featured, but the lovely miniature "water village" is Shaoxing, birthplace of Lu Xun, including the school at which he studied and the restaurant, theatre and ancestral hall mentioned in his writings. These, the guidebook tells us, "add a great romantic feeling to this modern village". Indeed, whatever you've read about unrest elsewhere in rural China, Shaoxing presents a "view of serene and peaceful rural scenery which makes one feel relaxed and happy".¹⁵ Mao's mausoleum is missing (as is contemporary Tiananmen altogether) but Sun Yat-sen's is not. Indeed, it is one of the larger exhibits and from the promontory on which it is set, in Orlando, at least, one can have a wonderful view of the surrounding models. It is the small plaque in front of the mausoleum which arrests the visitor familiar with Chinese history. Sun is described as the "son of a simple farmer" who studied Western ideas, lectured Chinese Americans in San Francisco on the need to change the government and then forced the last emperor of the Qing to abdicate, after which he became the first President of the Republic. Sun's short tenure in this position is not discussed. Instead, as in American versions of Chinese history written during the early Republic itself, he is the one and only Chinese revolutionary, the George Washington of his country.

The Shenzhen guidebook describes Sun as a "revolutionary forerunner" whose abiding commitment was to the "lofty ideal of unity". There is no mention of what exactly he foreran. In Orlando each plaque in addition to a brief description of the site has a time-line so that the visitor can place Chinese events in context. It is here that the only mention anywhere in the park of the revolution of 1949 occurs. Sun's time-line begins with the founding of the League of Nations, proceeds to the stock

market crash in 1929 and concludes without comment in 1949 and the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Other time-lines plot ancient monuments, such as the 3rd century Yellow Crane Tower against the contemporary persecution of Christians in Rome; the 15th century Temple of Heaven against the burning of Joan of Arc; the 14th century temple to Zhuge Liang - whose fame, by the way, the Shenzhen guidebook tells us, is "known even to women and children" - against the Black Death, etc.

The "lofty ideal of unity" is expressed as well in one or two other references to modern Chinese history. The Lugou Bridge, in addition to its magnificent 12th century marble arches, marks the beginning of China's war against the Japanese, "because it was here the Chinese army took its stand against Japanese soldiers on 7 July 1937". Which Chinese army? The plaque is blank.

The only other nod to modern Chinese history appears in the descriptive information given in front of the model of the Summer Palace, "rebuilt in 1888". "The original Summer Palace," we are told, "was destroyed in a war" - the identity of the combatants goes unmentioned - and the Empress Dowager, showing "great wisdom in her sense of priorities, misappropriated funds for the navy and used the money instead to rebuild". Thus is to be remembered the self-indulgence of the court, whose failure to protect China from foreign powers has been excoriated by Chinese nationalists from the late 19th century on. The political scientist Edward Friedman has insisted that the "anti-imperialist nationalism embodied in Maoism" has at last been "discarded", but I think even he might be surprised by the form its disposal takes here.¹⁶

The Great Wall meanders for half a mile through the park. This is a friendly Great Wall, lushly planted with bonsai trees. It does not enclose so much as accompany one. It is also the mythic wall, as Arthur Waldron's recent book describes it, the ultimate (if multivalent) symbol of the nation, "an object of pride to Chinese" who "revel in its size and are delighted at the reverent awe with which most foreigners approach it". In the Shenzhen guidebook it is the "symbol of Splendid China", "one of the eight wonders of the world", "the biggest defensive military structure in the world" built, in both China and Florida, of six million tiny hand-crafted bricks.¹⁷

In the miniaturized world of "Splendid China" it is possible to see Ben Anderson's "imagined community" made visible, to take a walking tour through the Chinese leadership's determined effort to repudiate the idea of the nation it had participated in building and now seeks to replace. The New China is peaceful, unified, ancient, capable. It has no political history to speak of, no abiding conflicts, no ruptures. The teachings of Confucius, according to the descriptive note in front of the temple dedicated to him, "were faithfully followed by most of China's sovereigns", and it is he who gave the world the Golden Rule. Before Socrates was born, when Europeans

were dying in the Black Death, and in periods when Christians burned each other at the stake or Crusaders fought the Turks, the Chinese had been peacefully, splendidly, building great monuments. Such wars as are mentioned were defensive, and the funds others might use for arms the Chinese put to the arts of peace, the creation of beauty.

Some distance from Orlando, but of a piece with the effort it represents, there is another realm in which the current Chinese government seeks certainty, stability and transcendent self-definition. A 19-member research team is currently hard at work, dedicated to the task of isolating the "quintessentially Chinese genes among the 100,000 terms of genetic code borne by human DNA". The researchers will "analyse the meaning of heredity [and] supply a biological basis to discern the dissemination and distribution of the Chinese race". According to the *People's Daily*, a beneficial side effect will be "national consciousness-raising". An article in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* observes with concern that the project could "turn into a potentially useful exercise to bolster Beijing's sovereignty over minority populations and their lands".¹⁸ China, then, can be defined racially, its identity essential, material, literally and unchallengeably in the genes.

Edward Friedman argues that, once upon a Maoist time, nationalism "seemed presuppositional to the identity of proud Chinese responding to the Communist Party's proclaimed mission of helping the people 'stand up' to foreign exploiters, domestic traitors and imperialism in any form". Rather than a "permanent national truth" this was "merely passing national myths".¹⁹ Certainly "Splendid China" supports this observation. Neither in Orlando nor in Shenzhen can the visitor find any reference to foreign exploiters or imperialism, but the picture grows murky if we turn to official responses to perceived slights. When a Chinese skater failed to receive the gold medal to which she felt she was entitled, the *People's Daily* explained the decision in terms which make one wonder if the anti-imperialist "national mythos" has really passed. "Certain foreigners have deep prejudices against Chinese," the editorial stated angrily, "and this certainly contains aspects of a colonialist mentality." Unnamed foreigners are accused of wishing to hold China back. "In the opinion of some, China is not even worth mentioning but is poor, backward and uncivilized. Chinese people are weak, shabby, dirty-faced peasants. In the big international family Chinese people can only obey." However, China is changing, the *People's Daily* insisted:

Only a strong, stable and prosperous China can win the respect of the world. We are not begging those who are prejudiced against China to change their opinions [but] will use our strength to prove that China is strong and the Chinese race is admirable. The facts will bear us out. The Chinese people are now on the road to prosperity, moving towards a glorious 21st century. This might make you happy, or it might make you unhappy, but none of you can stop it.²⁰

The terms have changed since Mao, when China's backwardness and poverty, its shabby and "dirty-faced peasants" were celebrated, but standing up to the foreigner remains an issue.

A similar note of defiance marks current exchanges with the US government on the issue of human rights and MFN. As demonstrated by their treatment of Secretary of State Warren Christopher on his recent visit, the Chinese have suspended efforts at piecemeal pacification of the Clinton administration and chosen instead to assert their right to control their internal affairs. By symbolic gesture and overt statement alike, the Chinese government has resisted American efforts to reform its treatment of political prisoners, arguing that human rights, as defined by the US, arrogantly ignore the fundamental right to a more comfortable life, which the government feels it is finally providing. This international assertion is also a domestic one. Dissent is division; the centre must hold. By contrast, the government has arrested Chinese who want China to stand up to the Japanese on the issue of compensation for victims of the Pacific war.

At a popular level, as I'm sure you are aware, the cult of Mao seems to grow exponentially as nostalgia and commodity. The tables at the "Black Earth" restaurant in Beijing are packed with people dining on peasant fare and the walls are covered with photographs of sent-down youth in their prime. A report estimates that about a quarter of the customers are veterans of the Cultural Revolution who take pride in their past.²¹ The "Remembering Bitterness, Thinking of Sweet Things" restaurant is crowded with middle-aged former sent-down youth, although here the message is more ambivalent: there are two menus, one offering simple northern home cooking at low prices, the other devoted to the luxury foods Deng's reforms have made available to a growing number of urban Chinese.

The "Mao Family Restaurant", which conducts a booming business in Shaoshan, has just opened a branch in Beijing. The facade is made of wooden logs and the internal decor is dominated by a 30-year-old photograph of Mao and a group of Shaoshan villagers, including the owner, Mrs Tang. On the other hand there are also disco lights, a karaoke room, an illuminated dance floor and softly lit "drinking booths". Mrs Tang's purpose is educational: "There are lots of veteran revolutionaries and their children who haven't been to Shaoshan. They don't know whether the food Chairman Mao ate was good, or whether the wine he drank was good, so I've brought them to Beijing."²² She told another reporter that her purpose was to "spread Mao Zedong thought". After all, his goal was to make China "rich and strong", and making money is an obvious way to do so. Her karaoke videos feature golden oldies, and one reporter has described a young policeman crooning "Chairman Mao, like the sun, leads the people forward", while a disco ball "flashed orange and green beams on his earnest face". When he had finished singing he defended the karaoke bar: "If Mao were

alive now, his thinking might be even more daring than that of Deng Xiaoping. He was not a backward person."²³

The regime's early efforts to contain Mao's image, limiting its relevance to the days of glory of the war against Japan, have yielded more recently to movements from below which recall a different Mao. Beyond the kitsch of Mao lighters (mine plays a particularly shrill version of "The East is Red"), clocks, T-shirts and genuine artefacts of the Cultural Revolution, now expensive antiques, Mao is being put to very different purposes. The Mao the regime wishes to sell (sometimes literally - a painting of Mao and some of his close friends celebrating the first anniversary of the revolution was recently removed from the mausoleum and auctioned off in Hong Kong), the popular singer Zhang Guangtian observes, is "the young firebrand or the wily field commander. Or else they stress the international statesman, the Mao who met Nixon." What inspires Zhang, who was born in 1967, is the Mao "who tried to give China what it has lacked for 5,000 years - a spiritual basis. That was the Mao of the Cultural Revolution." When Zhang tried to sing "Long Live the People" on a Beijing radio programme featuring his music, he was censored. Sample lyrics:

Look at us, in our tens of thousands. Now look at them, standing all alone.
See the justice on our side. Watch how soon they will be done for.

The explanation offered for censoring the song, that its setting, to the tune of "John Brown's Body", might "offend Christians", is most unlikely, especially in the light of recent efforts to ban the celebration of Christmas among college students.²⁴ Arrested in 1986 for his dissenting views, after his release in 1989 Zhang wandered around south-western China. According to an article by Matei Mihalca, that was where "he became aware of the charisma of Mao".²⁵ Had he travelled in the hinterland at a somewhat later date, Zhang might have seen a popular version of that charisma: Mao Mountain, a renamed mountain range in Xinjiang whose shape is said to reflect that of the recumbent Mao. Miniatures for the state; gigantism for the people.²⁶

In the virtual reality of "Splendid China" unity is doubly represented: seen from its perimeter, all of Chinese history and all of its peoples are collected so as to be represented by the centre. Yet the leadership is nowhere near as confident as these naturalizing moves suggest. Or rather, the moves themselves express the regime's unease. The leadership has reason to worry. Gerald Segal, in a recent report for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, says that Beijing only "pretends" to rule. Provincial power is steadily growing. Indeed - and this must be especially threatening to Beijing - the West is urged to deal directly with the provinces. Some trade disputes, Segal says, have become veritable trade wars, "including the use of 'some form of military force' to guarantee access to resources".²⁷ There have been serious anti-government movements in Ningxia, where 49 people were killed last May in fighting outside a mosque.

In October government forces stormed a mosque in Xining, Qinghai, and arrested Muslim leaders who were charged with having "assaulted local party and government offices, smashed police vehicles and besieged and attacked... men of the security and armed police".²⁸ Not forgetting, of course, that there is always Tibet.

The government's effort to produce, in Seamus Deane's words, a "monolithic" version of the past is clearly besieged. Perhaps this is because the history it attempts to erase is so very recent. More important I suspect is the fact that it has abandoned any effort to tell a story. A monolithic version of the past that has oddly refused to replace the deposed narrative with one of its own may tax a people's capacity to forget. Like the fairs earlier this century, "Splendid China" claims for the present the glories of a timeless past. It is hard not to see this particular exercise in miniaturization as real decline.

Notes

1 Seamus Deane, "Introduction", in Terry Eagleton, Fredric Jameson and Edward W. Said, *Nationalism, Colonialism and Literature*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990, p. 9.

2 Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, "Whither China's quest for national identity?", in *China's Quest for National Identity*, Ithaca: Cornell University, 1992, p. 268.

3 Yukiko Koshiro, *Trans-Pacific Racism: The US Occupation of Japan*, dissertation for Columbia University, 1992, p. 14, quoted by permission of the author. The Koreans, Ryukyuan and Chinese all protested vigorously and the Ryukyuan and Chinese exhibits were indeed cancelled, but not the Korean one.

4 Michael Godley, "China's World's Fair of 1910: Lessons from a forgotten event", in *Modern Asian Studies*, 12:3, 1978, pp. 503-522. I am grateful to Jim Hevia for this reference. On the San Francisco fair - and others in which China figured before the First World War - see Robert Rydell, *All the World's a Fair*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Rydell's book led me to the official account of the fair by Frank Morton Todd, *The Story of the Exposition: Being the Official History of the International Celebration Held at San Francisco in 1915 to Commemorate the Discovery of the Pacific Ocean and Construction of the Panama Canal*, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1921, Vol. 3, pp. 288, 290, 292, Vol. 4, p. 251.

5 Rydell, *All the World's a Fair*, p. 228.

6 *St. Petersburg Times*, 12 December 1993. *China News Digest*. My thanks to Ann Anagnost for sending me her file on this.

7 *Orlando Sentinel*, 12 December 1993. My thanks to Arthur Meltz for the clipping.

8 Ann Anagnost, "The Nationscape: Movement in the field of vision", *Positions*, 1:3, p. 586.

- 9 *ibid*, pp. 586, 589.
- 10 Todd, *The Story of the Exposition*, Vol. 3, p. 289.
- 11 *Orlando Sentinel*, 19 December 1993.
- 12 *Shenzhen: Splendid China, Miniature Scenic Spot*, p. 106. I am grateful to Ann Anagnost for lending me her copy of the guidebook.
- 13 *ibid*, p. 108.
- 14 *ibid*, p. 109-112.
- 15 *ibid*, p. 114.
- 16 See Edward Friedman, "A failed Chinese modernity", *Daedalus*, 122:2, Spring 1993, p. 2.
- 17 Arthur Waldron, *The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 220; guidebook, p. 11. This view of the Great Wall is not unchallenged. You will be familiar with the controversy over the documentary "River Elegy", whose sombre narration mourns precisely the China "Splendid China" celebrates. To its authors the Great Wall was not a symbol of China's splendours but rather a "monument to tragedy", representing not strength but "impotent defence and timidity in the face of invasion". Its legacy is "self-deception [imprinted] on the very soul of China". Translated by Geremie Barme and Linda Jaivin in *New Ghosts, Old Dreams*, New York: Times Books, 1992, p. 151. At the same time, public response to Deng Xiaoping's patriotic campaign ("Let us love our country and restore our Great Wall") seems to have been greeted with considerable popular enthusiasm. Waldron, pp. 1, 225.
- 18 Lincoln Kaye, "Quality control", in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 January 1994, p. 22.
- 19 Friedman, "Failed modernity", p. 2.
- 20 Report by Chen Huxiong, based on dispatches from *China News Digest*, Reuters and AP, 28 February 1994.
- 21 AP dispatch of 7 January 1994, quoted in *China News Digest*, 4 February 1994.
- 22 Catherine Samson, *Wall Street Journal*, 2 January, 1994, quoted in *China News Digest*, 4 February 1994.
- 23 Kathy Wilhelm, AP, 19 December 1993, quoted in *China News Digest*, 21 December 1993.
- 24 Not just Christmas, but Valentine's Day and April Fool's Day as well. The purpose of the ban is to "achieve a relatively stable cultural tradition on college campuses and promote our country's fine national culture", *China News Digest*, 9 December 1993.
- 25 Matei Mihalca, "The Pied Piper of Peking", in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 30 September, 1993, p. 55.
- 26 See Anagnost, "The nationscape", *Positions*, 1:3, p. 601.
- 27 Report on Segal study by Ming Zhang and Chuck Lin, *China News Digest*, 15 March, 1994.
- 28 Rone Tempest, *China News Digest*, 23 February 1994.

Cultural nationalism in contemporary Japan: The role of the state and the role of the market

Kosaku Yoshino

It was in the early 1980s that I began my study of cultural nationalism. At that time, very few people were studying this subject or even using the term cultural nationalism.¹ The increase in the literature on this topic over the past few years shows something of the increasing recognition of the importance of culture in what was once regarded as the realm of the political state. One of the points raised in my book, *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan*, published in 1992, is the importance of the hitherto neglected perspective of the "market" in the study of nationalism. Whilst it is certainly important to examine how the state "produces" and disseminates national myth and ideology, as previous studies have done, it is equally essential to draw attention to the market process whereby nationalism is "reproduced" and "consumed" irrespective of the intention of the state. In this paper I wish to show, with reference to the contemporary Japanese case, the importance of the perspective of the "market" in the development of cultural nationalism.

Some key terms should first be defined. By nationalism I mean both the sentiment among a people that they constitute a community with distinctive characteristics, and the project of maintaining and enhancing that distinctiveness within an autonomous state. Whereas political nationalism emphasizes the nation's collective experience as a political reality by achieving a representative state for its community, cultural nationalism serves to regenerate the national community by creating, preserving or strengthening a people's cultural identity when it is felt to be lacking or threatened. In short, cultural nationalism is concerned with the distinctiveness of the nation as a cultural and historical community. Another distinction that I wish to propose is the one between what I call "primary" and "secondary" nationalism. By primary nationalism I mean original nationalism, concerned with inventing national identity, in contrast to